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Abstract: Before 1977, the Spanish government was unable (or unwilling) to increase 
taxation to finance new social programs. As an alternative to this lack of fiscal capacity, 
Spanish policy makers in the early 20th century promoted contributive social insurance 
schemes (mostly financed from employers’ and employees’ contributions). To avoid 
social conflict in rural areas, rural laborers were also included in these programs. This, 
however, generated strong business opposition, especially from rural landowners and 
small-sized, labor intensive businesses (which were predominant in Spain). With the 
advent of democracy in 1931 new social plans were devised, but redistribution demands 
focused on land reform. After the Spanish civil war, Franco’s dictatorship consolidated 
a conservative social insurance model. Social benefits were kept very low and funding 
relied on employers’ and employees’ compulsory contributions. Labor movement 
repression and trade protectionism allowed companies to easily transfer the cost of 
social insurance to wages and consumer prices. The introduction of income tax, after the 
restoration of democracy in 1977, gave way to a new social protection model. Tax-
funded, non-contributory programs increased and social protection was extended to 
those without stable ties to the labor market. By 1977 wage dispersion had replaced 
property incomes concentration -particularly land ownership- as the main source of 
income inequality, and demands for tax-and-transfer redistribution replaced 1930s 
expropriation demands. Social spending growth, however, stagnated after the signing of 
the Maastricht treaty, before Spain reached the European levels. 
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, the Great Recession has hit the Spanish economy hard. The unemployment rate 
peaked in 	, reaching over  % of the working population, and government budget cuts 
became a commonplace. New political parties on both the left and the right of the political 
spectrum have emerged as a result of the political crisis that has appeared in parallel to the 
economic recession. Moreover, in some areas, like Catalonia, a very active pro-independence 
movement has gained momentum, partly due to the legitimacy crisis of Spanish institutions. All 
these new political demands, however, have been so far channeled in democratic, non-violent 
ways. In the Fragile State Index, for example, Spain appears as a stable state (just like France, 
the US or the UK), meaning that the vulnerability of the Spanish state to collapse is low.1 But 
this has not always been the case. Political violence was a relevant trait of &th and 	th century 
Spain. It became particularly intense after World War I and peaked in & -& with the outbreak 
of the Spanish Civil War. The country, indeed, went through two dictatorships (Primo de 
Rivera’s and Franco’s dictatorship) before the consolidation of democracy in &,,. Factors 
behind the reduction in social conflict and political instability are complex and diverse, but 
social policy is no doubt one of them. 
From the very beginnings of modern social policy in the late &th century, the explicit objective 
of the Spanish government was to promote social peace. However, unlike many of its European 
neighbors, Spain was unable to successfully develop m st of the social programs that today we 
associate with the welfare state (like old-age and disability pensions, public health-care or 
unemployment insurance). In Spain, a real welfare state did not develop until the late &,	s, 
early &
	s. Even today, when Spanish social policy is compared to that of other European 
countries some deficiencies persist. What explains this late development? Many studies have 
highlighted the importance of economic and demographic modernization plus the advent of 
democracy as key factors for the long run development of the welfare state (Lindert 		2). At 
the same time, a number of theories emphasize the role of specific actors. The so-called power 
resource theories, for example, mostly see the welfare state as the result of the pressure of the 
labor movement (Hicks &&&). However, employers (especially big-sized, capital intensive 
companies) also supported social legislation in some countries; so that the emergence of new 
social programs was often the result of some sort of cross-class alliances (Mares 		, Hellwig 
		7). Similarly, Baldwin (&&	) shows that the support of small and medium-sized farmers was 
crucial for the development of universalistic social programs in late &th, early 	th century 
Scandinavia, suggesting (again) that social policy outcomes are often the result of a mixture of 
social interests. More generally, it seems that homogenous and egalitarian societies are able to 
achieve political consensuses for social policy expansion more easily than heterogeneous and 
unequal societies. The reason is that, in the later, social empathy and social mobility 
expectations tend to be lower and redistribution costs higher (Alesina et al. 		, Lindert 		2, 
Bénabou 		7). 
All these factors played a relevant role in Spain. The Spanish government was unable to raise 
funds to finance new social programs until the &,, income tax reform. As an alternative, given 
this lack of fiscal capacity, Spanish policy-makers put the emphasis on contributory social-
insurance schemes (which were mostly financed by employers’ and employees’ contributions). 
However, this generated strong business opposition, especially from rural employers and small-
sized businesses, which were predominant in Spain. The alternative political regimes that 
existed in Spain throughout the 	th century tried to provide alternative solutions to this 
problem; but, as said before, the political consensus to fund and create a comprehensive social 
                                                   
1 Spain is, however, behind the best-positioned countries (with sustainable states), such as Germany or the Nordic 




protection system was not reached until the late &,	s. The following sections explain the story 
of this difficult consensus. 
 
Early measures and sources of social conflict 
In 

, the Spanish government created the Commission of Social Reforms (CRS in Spanish, 
for Comisión de Reformas Sociales), which was intended to study the living conditions of the 
working-class and to propose measures to improve them. Two years earlier, Bismarck had 
advocated in the German Reichstag for the promotion of social insurance to achieve political 
support from the working-class; and shortly later a comprehensive social insurance scheme, 
including Sickness insurance (

), workplace accident compensation (

2) and old-age 
pensions (

&) was introduced in Germany. In Spain, the years 

-
 were marked by intense 
social unrest affecting both rural and urban centers. Some examples are the strikes in cities like 
Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid, or the events related to La Mano Negra (“The Black Hand”) in 
Andalusia.2 However, unlike the previous decades of the &th century, repression was not the 




,-, ), the conservative party and the liberal party reach d 
an agreement to alternate peacefully in office during the period of the so-called Bourbon 
Restoration (
,2-&). According to this agreement, before each election the incumbent party 
ceded power to an interim government by the other party, who organized the election. This 
interim government, in turn, was always able to guarantee its own victory by means of a 
bargaining process with the local elites in their electoral districts plus extensive vote buying, 
mass fraud and even direct coercion. To some extent, corruption was the price for a certain 
degree of political stability.3 
In the social domain, the government also tried to in egrate politically the new emerging social 
movements (namely, the labor movement, which was growing in parallel to industrialization) 
and to reduce social unrest in the rural areas (especially in those areas where big farms where 
predominant). The use of the police and even the army to deal with social unrest remained a 




(under the liberal rule of President Sagasta) labor pr tests became increasingly tolerated by the 
government. Shortly later, in 

,, the Associations Law was passed and union rights were 
recognized, allowing for a gradual growth of the labor movement (Pérez Ledesma &&	). The 
first show of strength of the Spanish labor movement took place in 
&, with the celebration of 
May Day. At the same time, the Spanish government complemented this recognition of social 
rights with the extension of franchise to all men in 
&	. Finally, the publication of the 
encyclical Rerum Novarum in 
& stimulated the rise of Spanish social Catholicism (which, in 
turn, was particularly influential in the conservati e party), consolidating the reformist trends 
initiated with the creation of the CRS in 

. In the introduction of the Royal Decree creating 
the CRS, Segismundo Moret (Minister of the Interior at that time) admitted that Spanish social 
policy was to some extent underdeveloped compared to other European countries and that “it 
was not possible to maintain this situation without lessening public peace” (Gaceta, December 
	, 

, reproduced in Castillo &
7, p. CXLIII). The explicit objective of the CRS was, indeed, 
to achieve “the [social] peace (…) between the two big production factors: labor and capital” (p. 
CXLIV), and channel labor demands away from revoluti nary means. 
                                                   
2 Presumably, La Mano Negra was a secret anarchist organization to which the government attributed a number of 
violent actions, including the destruction of crops and even murders. According to Tuñón de Lara (&,), however, 
La Mano Negra, as a formal organization, never existed. Rather, t political violence existing in rural Andalusia ws 
used as an excuse by the Spanish government to initiate a severe repression and combat peasant revolts. 
3 About the functioning of the Bourbon Restoration electoral system, see Varela (		) or Curto-Grau et al. (	). 
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The Spanish government, however, not only focused on the new conflicts emerging in industrial 
cities, but it also focused on traditional, rural conflicts. &th century Spanish agriculture was 
characterized by a high land ownership inequality. In southern Spain, large states (the so-called 
latifundios) represented more than half of the total rural area and peasant uprisings were 
common since the early &th century.4 After the visit of Bakunin’s envoy, Giussepi Fanelli, to 
Spain in 
 
, rural Andalusia became an important source of militants for anarchist 
organizations. Anarchist unions were in fact majoritarian among Spanish labor unions until at 
least the &	s; and landless laborers always represented a big share of total union membership5. 
Since the objective of the government was to deactiv te revolutionary social movements, paying 
attention to the rural areas (and not only to the new industrial cities) was crucial. Spanish social 
reformers, however, did not try at any time to change the structure of land ownership by means 
of any forced expropriation or any other type of agrarian reform. Rather, they were hoping to 
find the way to “alleviate the evils affecting the rural working classes”, so that “the property can 
live safely” (Castillo &
7, p. CXLV). 
In this context, the CRS was initially charged with a number of social tasks: promoting the 
regulation of child and female labor, the regulation f the working conditions in industrial 
factories, promoting the creation of Jurados Mixtos (to solve industrial disputes between 
employers and employees), promoting the creation of old-age and disability pension funds, and 
promoting the creation of agrarian banks and reforms facilitating rural laborers’ access to land 
(p. CXLIX). However, the only significant work undertaken by the Commission before 
&	 
was an ambitious study on the conditions of the working class that compiled a great deal of 
information, but did not translate into any specific policy measure. In fact, both socialist and 
anarchist unions saw the CRS with skepticism. They w re convinced that it will not be useful to 
introduce any significant change in their living conditions (De la Calle 		2). In 
&	, the CRS 
was reformed and became some sort of advising commission for the government; but again no 
specific measure was introduced until &		, when the occupational accidents law was passed. 
This law obliged employers in the industrial sector to pay mandated benefits to their employees 
in case of work-related accidents. However, the initial impact of this measure was very limited. 
The benefits set by the government were very low and employers often failed to fulfil their 
commitments due to the lack of inspection (Silvestre and Pons, 		). This, in fact, anticipated 
two permanent traits of the evolution of Spanish social policy: employers’ opposition to social 
reform and the inability (unwillingness perhaps) of the government to enforce social legislation. 
 
From voluntary, state-subsidize insurance to compulsory insurance 
In &	, the former CRS was replaced by the Institute of Social Reform (IRS in Spanish, for 
Instituto de Reformas Sociales). The IRS objectives were (again) to promote social legislation 
and watch over its enforcement. To gain social legitimation, the IRS was expected to include in 
its decision-making bodies representatives from both labor and employers. Employers’ 
representation, however, was very limited, partly because employers showed little interest in 
participating, and partly because of the lack of associative tradition among Spanish business 
groups. Labor representation was very limited too. The anarchist union, the CNT 
                                                   
4 Malefakis (&,	) chapters  and 7. 
5 In 

, 	,&7 of the 7,,&2 members of the Spanish Anarchist Federation were agrarian workers, mostly from 
Andalusia; and total Andalusian membership (
,2&) still far exceeded that of industrial Catalonia (,	) 
(Malefakis &,	) p. 7&. In &&, the anarchist union CNT (Conferederación Nacional del Trabajo) had ,		,&22 
members, while the socialist union UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) had 7	,
 members (Silvestre 		b, 
appendix). The initial growth of the socialist unio, the UGT, was slower than that of the anarchist unions, and more 
restricted to industrial and urban areas, like Madrid and the Basque country. However, as is shown in the following 
sections, when the UGT eventually surpassed the number of affiliates of the CNT in the early &	s and became the 
largest union in Spain, it was also possible due to a large increase in its rural affiliates. 
  
 
(Confederación Nacional del Trabajo), rejected any kind of collaboration with the government 
(as already happened with the CRS before). They were convinced that the IRS was useless, 
rather a distraction for the (revolutionary) interests of the working class. On the other hand, the 
direction board of the IRS considered that social-catholic unions were not genuine 
representatives of labor interests, because they agglutinated within a single organization both 
employers and employees. As a result, labor representation relied almost exclusively on the 
socialist union, the UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores), which this time became more 
willing to collaborate with the reformist agenda of the government (Montero &

). In this 
context, the IRS was unable to promote permanent social pacts between labor and capital, as 
intended by the government; but it did play a very active role in promoting social legislation. 
One of the projects emerging from the IRS was the National Institute of Social Security (INP in 
Spanish for Instituto Nacional de Previsión), created in &	
 to manage the so-called Retiro 
Obrero, or “Worker’s Retirement”. This was a voluntary, state-subsidized old-age pension 
scheme, where potential beneficiaries were all wage earners (from both industry and 
agriculture) with a yearly income below .			 pesetas, which was a high threshold for that 
time.6 When designing the Retiro Obrero the government took as a reference the voluntary 
state-subsidized insurance schemes existing in Belgium and Italy (Montero &

). In fact, before 
World War I, Spanish social reformers always advocated for the creation of voluntary state-
subsidized insurance schemes, in front of the compulsory insurance model prevailing in 
Germany. This was, in part, due to ideological reasons. Spanish social reformers believed that 
voluntary insurance had the advantage of getting workers involved in the solution of their own 
problems. Workers had to voluntary join an insurance fund (and pay for the corresponding fees) 
before they got the governmental subsidy. In contrast, compulsory insurance, they said, did not 
promote individual virtues, as “with its automatic retentions on the pay-roll (…) do not demand 
to the insured person any pro-saving attitude” (Eza &2, p. 2). 
However, voluntary insurance schemes were also preferred because of practical reasons. They 
involved a much lower cost for the government. Compulsory insurance was considered an 
“absorbent and monstrous bureaucratic mechanism”. By contrast, in the case of voluntary state-
subsidized insurance programs, all the managerial tasks fell on the private funds, involving an 
effective way to “alleviate government burdens” (González and Oyuelos, &2; pp. 	 and  ,). 
Some social reformers even argued that (voluntary, state-subsidized) social insurance would 
help reduce public spending on traditional poor relief: “The state budget cannot meet all social 
needs (…). The more the government promote and channels social insurance, the less it will 
have to attend in the future to the expenditures in poor relief, which are overwhelming for the 
public treasury” (Maluquer & , p. 	). As in Germany, more than fighting poverty, the 
objective of the Spanish government was to integrat politically the labor movement. But unlike 
Germany, Spain tried to avoid compulsory insurance as long as possible. The Spanish 
government was reluctant to assume any increasing cost to improve social protection, and 
refused to alter significantly the tax structure. As one might expect in this context, the R tiro 
Obrero had a very limited impact. In &
, after 	 years in force, there were only ,
,   insured 
persons to the Retiro Obrero, representing in the vicinity of % of the labor force (Elu, 		). 
Even though the Spanish government was trying to promote social policy to integrate politically 
the labor movement, the truth is that before World War I the labor movement was too weak to 
influence government policies. There were some outbreaks of violence and massive 
mobilizations before &, like the so-called Semana trágica in Barcelona in &	& and the wave 
of strikes that shook many rural areas in &	 and &	2. However, even in &	 union density in 
Spain was around % of the active population (Silvestre 		b). This changed quite suddenly 
                                                   
6 In &	, average daily wage in industry was .

 pesetas. Assuming 
	 working days per year, this involves a 
yearly wage of 
	 .2 pesetas (see Vilar 		2, p. 7 ). 
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throughout World War I. Even though Spain remained as a neutral country, the economic 
imbalances caused by the war and the contagious effect o  the Russian revolution led to a huge 
increase in social unrest. Largo Caballero (socialist representative in the Spanish parliament) 
attributed the “whole labor mobilization occurred from  to the general strike in August 
[]” to high inflation and unemployment: “the high cost of subsistence and the lack of work” 
(cited in Espuelas 	, p.
,). Organized labor increased substantially in this context. Union 
density, in fact, increased from % to % of the active population in &	, and remained in 
similar levels from thereafter. 
To regain political stability, the government tried to stimulate the development of social 
legislation. In &,, in a Conference for Social Insurance, the government made a commitment 
to create a comprehensive social insurance system (including occupational accidents, old-age, 
illness, maternity leave and unemployment). This time the government admitted that, to be 
effective, social insurance had to be compulsory. As the viscount of Eza (Minister of the Interior 
at the time) put it: “For reasons of high social convenience, since it isa question of repairing 
inevitable evils, which equally interest everyone, it was necessary to take the principle of 
obligation to the practice of Social Security” (Royal Decree, July &, &,). After the 
conference, the socialist party (which had won its first seat in parliament in &	) demanded in 
its parliamentary speeches that the government honored its social promises. Several projects, 
including projects for the creation of unemployment i surance, health insurance, and 
occupational accidents insurance in agriculture, were discussed both in the Spanish parliament 
and in the INP. However, the only program that came to fruition was the Retiro Obrero 
Obligatorio, or “Compulsory Worker’s Retirement”, a compulsory old-age pension system 
established in &&. 
Unlike many European countries, where the rural population were often excluded from early 
social insurance programs, the new Compulsory Worker’s Retirement included both rural and 
urban workers alike. The reason is the intense social conflict characterizing rural Spain at the 
time. As shown before, revolutionary labor movements had been gaining influence in rural 
Spain since late &th century, especially where big farms were predominant. In &, rural Huelva 
was, after urban Barcelona, the province where the anarchist CNT had more affiliates (as a 
percentage of the active population).7 Since the objective of the government was to deactivate 
revolutionary movements, extending social insurance to rural areas must have appeared as a 
political need. However, it is precisely this extensio  to rural areas one of the reasons that 
hindered social reform in Spain. Rural landowners became, in fact, a powerful source of 
opposition to government plans. This opposition stopped government plans to extend 
occupational accidents insurance to agriculture, as well as plans to create an unemployment 
insurance scheme in &&- (Del Rey &&, Espuelas 	). For the same reason, when the 
Compulsory Worker’s Retirement came into effect affiliation records in agriculture were 
disappointing (Elu 		). 
In general, business opposition to social insurance i  Spain was very strong. Apart from the 
opposition from rural landowners, small-sized, labor intensive companies in the industrial sector 
were very reluctant to the introduction of social insurance. In many European countries, 
rejection to compulsory social insurance was often more severe among small-sized companies 
and rural landowners than among big-sized, capital-in ensive companies. In some countries, the 
latter even supported the introduction of social insurance to enhance productivity growth, 
reduce labor unrest, or gain competitiveness in front of their smaller competitors (Ullman &
, 
Mares 		, Hellwig 		7). In Spain, however, small-sized companies were predominant 
(Comín and Martín Aceña && ). Unlike Bismarck’s Germany, Spain lacked a broad industrial 
                                                   




base willing to support compulsory social insurance. The labor movement, for its part, did not 
show full support to social reform either. In general terms, the socialist sectors of the labor 
movement supported government social plans and evenasked for more state intervention. 
However, the revolutionary sectors, basically the anarchist movement, did not trust government 
intentions and saw social insurance plans as a distraction from the real interests of the working 
class. The inability of the government to fulfil its social promises and the slow pace followed by 
Spanish social policy hindered the political integration of the labor movement within the 
political system of the Spanish Restoration and helped to consolidate these revolutionary 
positions (Bengoechea, &&2; Castillo, &&-&&; Barrio, &&,). 
Besides employers opposition and the rather weak support that government plans received from 
the labor movement, there is a third factor explaining the inability of the government to develop 
new social programs. Even in the convulsive years following World War I, the Spanish 
government remained reluctant to assume any financial cost derived from improving social 
protection. The possibility of creating (fully) tax-funded programs (as the 
& Danish old-age 
pensions) was never contemplated. As we have seen, th  government tried to promote 
compulsory insurance (instead of the previously advocated voluntary, state-subsidized 
programs). However, in this case, the bulk of the cost of social insurance would rely on 
employers and employees. In fact, even after the introduction of the Compulsory Worker’s 
Retirement, the Spanish Institute for Social Security complained several times because the 
government was not paying the corresponding subsidies to the new pensions fund (Elu 		). As 
will be shown in the following sections, in the early decades of the 	th century, the Spanish 
government was unable (or unwilling) to undertake th  needed tax reforms to increase 
government revenues and fund new social programs (Comín && ). Lastly, the political context 
was not optimal either. The government had been unable to materialize most of its social 
promises during the convulsive years following World War I. However, after the military coup 
of & and the establishment of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (&-	) all the post-
World-War-I plans to improve social insurance were abandoned. The government only 
introduced some subsidies for large families in &,, a policy that was consistent with Catholic 
social morality and the influence acquired by the Church during the dictatorship (Velarde &&	). 
To regain momentum, social policy had to wait to the advent of democracy in &. 
 
The second republic: momentum and limitations 
With the advent of the Second Republic (&- ), started what Linz et al. (		7) view as the 
first truly democratic period in the Spanish history. Even though it was a short period of time, it 
generated many reformist expectations among diverse social sectors that aspired to democratize 
the Spanish political and social life. These expectations, however, soon turned into intense 
social tensions leading to the highest levels of political mobilization and social unrest in Spanish 
contemporary history (Pérez Ledesma &&	). During the years of the Second Republic, the 
socialist party became the most voted party (althoug  it never get enough votes to rule on its 
own). In &- was in office jointly with other left and center-left parties. In the second 
legislature, in &-7, was the main party in the opposition, after an agreement of right and 
center-right parties to form government.8 The growth of the socialist party in this new 
democratic context was due to the broadening of its urban and industrial base but also to the 
rapid consolidation, in a short period of time, of a broad rural base. In &, the UGT, the 





                                                   
8 About the electoral results in this time-p riod, see Linz et al. (		7), p. 	&&. 
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As in previous episodes of the Spanish history, rural interests conditioned the evolution of social 
policy in the second republic. During the Bourbon Restoration, attempts to extend social 
insurance to agriculture faced the opposition from rural landowners. This time, the implicit 
alliance between landless laborers and industrial workers gave the socialist party enough 
political power to launch its program of social reform. The socialists, in fact, pressed to include 
social rights in the & Spanish Constitution. The right to social insurance, for example, was 
granted in article 2 : “The Republic will guarantee to all workers the necessary conditions of a 
dignified existence. Its legislation will regulate the cases of sickness, accidents, unemployment, 
old-age, disability and survivors insurance”. Progress in social legislation was particularly 
striking between & and &, when the socialist party was in office (Samaniego &

). The 
government introduced the so-called maternity insurance (granting healthcare during childbirth 
and maternity leave benefits for working women), created a voluntary, state-subsidized 
unemployment insurance scheme, and extended occupational accident insurance to agriculture. 
A plan was also devised to unify all social insurance programs within a single social security 
system, encompassing the aforementioned pre-existing programs plus new programs (providing 
health-care, sickness leave, and disability and survivors pensions). However, the discussion of 
the details of this plan lasted for several years. Eventually, the military coup of &  prevented it 
from being passed before the Spanish civil war (Pons and Vilar 	2). 
The difficulties that appeared for the implementation of this unification plan are partly due to 
the persistence of traditional obstacles. Mutual-aid ssociations and commercial insurance 
companies, for example, opposed the plan. They feared being displaced by state insurance and 
advocated for voluntary programs. Doctors, in turn, feared the loss of professional freedom that 
a compulsory insurance scheme could entail. They believed that such a program would reduce 
“the medical classes to the role of simple civil servants, controlled by other administrative civil 
servants” (Donato Fuejo, June & , cited in Samaniego &

, p.  
). The government also had 
to deal with the traditional employers’ opposition, and to a lesser extend with workers 
opposition. When maternity insurance came into effect in &, many working women opposed 
the subsequent mandatory contributions. In areas like Catalonia, Zaragoza, Galicia and Valencia 
there were strikes against the new compulsory maternity insurance, often promoted by the CNT, 
the anarchist union (Pons 		). The government was aware of this potential opposition, but as 
the Spanish Institute for Social Security put it in a pamphlet of & , it hoped that workers’ 
opposition to compulsory contributions would decrease “if the insured person receives instant 
benefits, as those granted by health insurance” (INP & , p. &). 
In fact, a crucial characteristic of the new plan was that it “does not cast on the state any burden 
that has not been already recognized” (INP & , p. ,2). This means that the government would 
maintain current public subsidies to preexisting old-age pension and maternity funds, but the 
new benefits included in the unification plan (health-care, sickness leave, and disability and 
survivors pensions) would be entirely financed from e ployers’ and employees’ compulsory 
contributions. The government announced this as a virtue: tax-payers did not need to worry 
about any unbearable burden. But precisely this must have aggravated th opposition from 
employers and employees. Above all, this (again) reflects the unwillingness of the Spanish 
government to assume the cost of improving social protection. This, in turn, was the result of 
weak fiscal capacity. Since the early 	th century, the Spanish economy had dragged permanent 
public deficits, which aggravated during World War I and again during the Great Depression in 
the &	s. Left-wing governments in the second republic undertook several tax reforms to 
increase public revenues. Tax rates on land ownership and industrial equity were increased, and 
a new tax on gasoline was introduced. The most important measure was the creation of an 
income tax in &, but even this was a very soft reform, unable to solve the financial problems 
of the government. 
	 
 
Only people with yearly incomes above 		,			 pesetas were subject to the new income tax. 
Tax rates ranged between a minimum % and a maximum ,.,% for incomes above ,			,			 
pesetas. The & Spanish GDP was .22
 pesetas per person,9 so that the percentage of 
population subject to the new income tax must have been very low. Jaume Carner, Minister of 
Finance at the time, was convinced that this was the only feasible reform for the moment. A 
more ambitious project would have meet strong opposition. He, actually, hopped that the 
income tax could be gradually extended to a broader segment of the population in the future, by 
lowering the 		.			 peseta threshold (Costa 			). After the introduction of the income tax, 
state revenues grew from &.2% of GDP in && to % in &7, but public spending growth was 
even faster so that public deficits remained (Comín && ). The government also made a huge 
effort to invest in public works to reduce unemployment, especially in rural areas where big 
farms were predominant and rural unemployment higher (Espuelas 	). However, the most 
ambitious policy undertaken to combat agrarian unemployment was the agrarian reform. 
The most active promoter of the reform was the socialist party, which as seen before had been 
able to mobilize a broad rural base in the &	s. To launch the reform, the socialists counted 
with the support of Manuel Azaña and the left-wing republicans. These believed that meeting 
socialists’ demands was the only way to guarantee th  working classes “would remain loyal to 
the Republic rather than succumb to the Anarcho-syndicalist cries for total opposition” 
(Malefakis &,	, p. &). The agrarian reform, in fact, had the explicit objective of achieving 
social peace in rural areas and contribute to the democratization of the political life. The 
socialists, moreover, believed that the agrarian reform would contribute to reduce urban 
unemployment by reducing rural migrations to industrial cities (Espuelas 	). However, the 
Spanish government was unable to successfully deal with the predictable opposition from rural 
landowners. During the first legislature (under a republican-socialist coalition government) the 
reform progressed very slowly, precisely because th government was trying to avoid 
landowners’ opposition as much as possible. In the second legislature (with a right-wing 
coalition in government) the reform was practically paralyzed. Initially, this provoked the 
disappointment of the rural base of the socialist par y, and later its radicalization. When the left 
came to power again in February & , the agrarian reform accelerated, until it was interrupted 
by the military coup of July & . The factors behind the outbreak of the Spanish civil war are 
diverse, but tensions resulting from the agrarian reform were crucial. For that reason it has often 
been characterized as a peasant war (Malefakis &,	). 
 
Franco’s dictatorship: a conservative social insurance model 
After the Civil War (&- ), Franco’s dictatorship (&&-&,,) imposed severe political 
repression. The army led postwar repression and the country remained under the military law 
until April &2
. Unlike previous civil conflicts in Spain, like the Carlist Wars in the &th 
century, this time there was not any reconciliation attempt. On the contrary, the goal was to 
achieve a definitive defeat of the enemy to avoid a reemergence of the reformist ambitions of 
the second republic (Tusell 		7). Political parties were outlawed, with the exception of Falange 
Española, the official party. In the domain of labor relations, employers and employees were 
forced to join the so-called Vertical Union. Independ nt labor unions were prohibited as well as 
strikes, which were considered a sedition offense, and therefore punishable by the death penalty 
(Pérez Ledesma &&	). Business associations, by contrast, remained legaland could, indeed, act 
as a pressure group (Molinero and Ysas &&
). Many businessmen and landowners even became 
members of the parliament. These were, in fact, part of the political elite of the dictatorship 
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along with high-ranking civil servants, the military, the Catholic Church, and politicians coming 
from monarchic groups and the Falange (Jerez && ). 
The Spanish economy recovered very slowly after the civil war. The &7 income levels were 
not reached again until &7. Real wages had an even worse performance. Industrial real wages 
did not recover the &- levels until & - . In agriculture, real wages in &7& were only 
,,% of the &  real wage. This bad performance was mostly the result of the reduction in 
workers’ bargaining power (Vilar 		2, Barciela and López 		). As for social protection, 
most social insurance schemes created before the civil war continued operating. The only 
exception was unemployment insurance, which was abolished until its reintroduction in & . 
The policy makers of the dictatorship believed that unemployment benefits only contributed to 
laziness. Girón de Velasco, Ministry of Labor between &2 and &7,, claimed that, 
“unemployment insurance [in Europe] fatally engendere  a tendency to indolence and indirectly 
to vice and even degeneration” (&7, p.&). The Republican project for social insurance 
unification was also abandoned. Franco’s dictatorship, owever, created some new social 
programs. During the civil war, for example, the government created the Auxilio de Invierno 
(Winter Relief), an institution linked to Falange, that shortly later was renamed as Auxilio Social 
(Social Relief). Its initial mission was to meet the social needs derived from the war in the side 
of pro-Franco rebels. Later on, as Franco’s army was gaining terrain, the Auxilio Social served 
as an instrument of Franco’s propaganda in the republican areas, by handing out bread to the 
population and organizing soup-kitchens. Once the war was finished, the Auxilio Social became 
a parallel welfare institution to traditional poor relief (Cenarro 		 ). 
Also during the war, a family allowance called Subsidio Familiar was introduced. This offered 
bonus payments to all wage earners based on the number of children. Pro-family (conservative) 
policies played a key role in the rhetoric of the dictatorship. This family allowance was largely 
the outgrowth of the regime’s population ideology and the influence of the Catholic Church’s 
social doctrine, which advocated for a sufficient family wage (Velarde &&	). This measure was 
also aimed at reducing female labor force participation. Women’s work was attributed with all 
kinds of social evils: “the mother is forced to work out of home because of the lack of resources 
(…) and consequences are fatal. Increase in maternal mortality during childbirth; increase in 
infant mortality (…); brutal drop in birth rates (…); no education for the children, [who are] 
abandoned to the evil teachings of the street; badly fulfilled her housework, making the home 
unpleasant and pushing her husband to the tavern and bar (…) Bringing the mother back to 
home is an ideal and we need to move towards it. The Subsidio Familiar can be the most 
effective way” (Aznar, &2, pp. -,). 
Finally, a compulsory health insurance scheme (SOE in Spanish, for Seguro Obligatorio de 
Enfermedad) was also set up in &2-22. According to Girón de Velasco, the intended mission 
of this insurance was to increase workers “performance” by improving their health conditions. 
&th century social reformers had already insisted in the potential positive effects of social 
insurance on health conditions and the subsequent positive effects on labor productivity10. Girón 
de Velasco, moreover, attributed an explicit political function to the new sickness insurance. It 
had to serve to make “proselytism, [and] gain for the motherland and the revolution new 
adepts” (Girón de Velasco &2, p.  ,). Despite propaganda, social protection levels remained 
very low during Franco’s dictatorship. In &7
, Spanish social spending was only .% of GDP, 
whereas in Greece it was 	.2%, in Italy .%, and in Germany 
.% (table ). Coverage rates 
remained very low too. Rural laborers were excluded from the old-age pension scheme between 
&& and &2. Permanent rural laborers were excluded from health insurance until &7, and 
non-permanent rural laborers until &7
. Even in &7& (when rural laborers had already been 
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&	s social insurance unification (INP 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Workers’ Compulsory Retirement after World War I (Maluquer & ). 
 
 
formally included in social security), the coverage rate of health insurance was only ,% of the 
active population; and the total number of beneficiaries (including insured’s family) was only 

% of total population. As for old-age pensions, coverage rates were even lower. In &7&, only 
% of the active population was included in the scheme11. 
 
 
Table . Public social spending in selected European countries (% of GDP), - 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Furthermore, pensions remained very low throughout the &2	s and &7	s. The reason is that 
they were only partially indexed to inflation (and these decades were characterized by high 
inflation rates). Table  shows the evolution of old-age pensions between &2	 and &7&. As can 
be seen, average old-age pensions in nominal terms increased gradually during this time-period 
(column ). However, when we analyze the evolution in real terms the result is completely 
different (column ). Average old-age pensions measured in real terms decreased constantly 
from &2	 to &77. They recovered after &7 , but even in &7& real old-age pension benefits 
were similar to those of &2	. If replacement rates are analyzed, the results are very similar. 
Taking as a reference the average unskilled industrial wage, average replacement rates 
oscillated between 	 and 	% of the salary during the whole time-period (column 7). Social 
protection remained limited to a minimum during Franco’s dictatorship. Moreover, this meager 
social protection network was almost exclusively financed from employers’ and employees’ 
compulsory contributions. In &7&, government subsidies to social insurance funds (including 
old-age pensions, health insurance, and the Subsidio Familiar) were % of total revenues (INP 
& 	). This allowed Franco’s regime to finance social insurance without increasing taxation 
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population from Nicolau (		7). 
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Table  . Old-age benefits (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Business groups, in turn, showed little opposition t  this social insurance funding strategy (at 
least until the & 	s). During the &2	s and &7	s, Franco’s dictatorship adopted an import 
substitution industrialization strategy, based on intense trade protectionism and a very active 
state intervention. Wages (and prices) were dependent on government regulation and, as 
mentioned before, labor unions were prohibited. This allowed employers to easily transfer the 
cost of social insurance to wages (as potential workers opposition was silenced). At the same 
time, trade protectionism and the lack of international competition allowed employers to 
transfer part of the cost of compulsory insurance to final prices and consumers (Espuelas 	). 
This situation, however, changed gradually fter &7&. In &7,-7& there were an economic crisis 
originated in the external sector. The lack of dynamism of Spanish exports plus a big 
overvaluation of the Spanish peseta provoked a highdeficit in the balance of trade. To correct 
this situation, the government devised the so-called &7& Stabilization Plan. The peseta was 
devaluated to gain international competitiveness and a strict monetary policy was implemented 
to defend the new exchange rate. In parallel, a number of liberalizing measures were gradually 
introduced and most aggressive forms of state intervention were abandoned. State controls over 
private investment diminished, and the economy becam  more and more opened to international 
trade. After the initial recession of &7&- 	 the Spanish economy recovered very rapidly, 
growing at an average rate of ,% per year between & 	 and &,2.12 
As in other developed countries, economic growth stimulated the development of social policy. 
Urbanization and the ageing of population generated new social demands, and rising incomes 
generated higher public revenues (Lindert 		2 and Tanzi and Schuknetch 			). Similarly, 
rural-urban migration helped to overcome traditional opposition of rural landowners to social 
insurance. As in other industrial countries, rural landowners became more willing to accept 
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social insurance to retain population in the rural areas.13 In &7& the government created the 
National Mutuality for Agrarian Social Security to “situate the protection granted to the agrarian 
worker at the same level to that of the urban workers” (Decree  /&7&). Lastly, the gradual 
growth of a clandestine labor movement also favored th  growth of social policy from the mid-
& 	s onwards. Between &7  and &7
, there were a number of strikes demanding higher 
wages. These started in Pamplona and extended to the Basque Country, Barcelona and mining 
areas in Asturias. For the first time since the civil war, the response of the government consisted 
in a combination of repression and (some) social concessions (Pérez Ledesma &&	). In the 
context of the aforementioned economic liberalization, the government passed the &7
 
Collective Agreement Act, which conceded the employees the ability to negotiate wages and 
working conditions with their employers14. 
Strikes remained illegal, especially when involving political demands, but they were tolerated 
when responding to economic reasons (that is, when t y were specifically linked to the 
collective bargaining process legalized in &7
). The number of collective agreements increased 
very rapidly after the enforcement of the law. In & , the number of employees included in a 
collective agreement was above ,		,			 persons, and in & & it was above ,,		,			 persons 
(Maluquer and Llonch 		7). This way employees obtained higher wages in exchange for 
productivity improvements, which in turn stimulated conomic growth. However, this measure 
also had unintended consequences for the government. It favored the rise of a new clandestine 
labor movement, which took advantage of the new organizational opportunities offered by the 
&7
 collective bargaining law to incorporate political and social demands to labor mobilizations 
(Pérez Ledesma &&	, Molinero and Ysas &&
). In parallel, new opposition movements of 
university students and groups of Social Catholics g ving support to workers’ demands appeared 
in the mid-& 	s, early &,	s. This combination of social movements, in fact, became the main 
source of political instability in the final years of Franco’s dictatorship (Tusell 		7). The 
government response, again, consisted in a combination of severe political repression and social 
policy expansion. 
A new Social Security Act came into effect in & / ,, bringing together under a single and 
more streamlined social security system preexisting social insurance programs. Coverage (that 
until that time had been limited to medium- and low-income workers) was extended to all wage 
earners. This represented some progress towards universalization. Nonetheless, the Spanish 
social protection system still marginalized the population without stable ties to the labor market; 
the so-called special regimes (providing differentiated benefits for specific groups) persisted; 
and the cost of social security remained borne almost exclusively by employers and employees 
compulsory contributions (with very little public subsidies during the entirety of the 
dictatorship). Despite the limitations, social spending grew very rapidly after the & / , 
reforms, rising from 2.	 % of GDP in &   to .,% in &,7 (see table ). However, growing 
labor demands and increasing exposure to international trade (after the gradual economic 
liberalization of &7
/7&) prevented employers to easily transfer the cost of social security to 
wages or consumer prices. In the &,	s, employers’ complaints about the unbearable cost of 
social insurance became a commonplace (Cabrera and Del Rey 		). However, even in &,7, 
Spanish social spending was only 7&% of the European average (table ). For Spain to 
homologate with its European neighbors, it was necessary to wait until the restoration of 
democracy in &,,. 
 
                                                   
13 See Mares (		) for the case of Germany. 
14 Before &7
 employers where not even allowed to increase wages without the authorization of the Spanish 
government. About labor market regulation in that time-period, see Vilar (		2). 
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The restoration of democracy and convergence with Europe 
After Franco’s dead in &,7, political changes accelerated until the first general election took 
place in &,,. The transition to democracy coincided with a period of economic downturn and 
increasing unemployment. In this context, social policy was crucial for political stability and the 
successful consolidation of democracy. The best example of the social consensus reached 
during the transition to democracy are the &,, Moncloa Pacts. Workers’ and employers’ 
representatives plus the main political parties agreed to accept wage moderation plus 
macroeconomic stabilization policies and inflation control in return for greater social protection, 
progressive taxation and the consolidation of political freedoms. One very important outcome of 
the Moncloa Pacts was the introduction of income tax in &,,. This broke one of the most 
important historical barriers to the development of Spanish social policy. Until then social 
insurance had been almost exclusively financed by employers’ and employees’ compulsory 
contributions. This changed after the &,, tax reform. Public subsidies to social security 
institutions increased substantially. Franco’s model of social insurance funding was gradually 
abandoned. This in turn allowed social spending to increase without putting so much pressure 
on employers’ and employees’ contributions. 
In the &
	s, Spanish social spending reached similar levels to that of other southern European 
countries, like Italy or Greece, although it remained below the leading countries, like Sweden o 
Germany (see table ). Access to healthcare was universalized in &
 , welfare benefits for 
disabled persons improved substantially after &
, non-contributory, old-age and disability 
pensions were introduced in &&	, and the governments of Spain’s autonomous communities 
gradually introduced minimum income programs for low-income families throughout the &&	s. 
All of this represented a gradual improvement in social provision. It permitted a coverage 
expansion to sectors without stable ties to the labor market, and made the Spanish social 
protection system more universal and redistributive. It is hard to know exactly why it was 
possible to reach a successful consensus to preserve political stability and promote social policy 
development in &,,, whereas it was impossible in &-& . In both cases, the advent of 
democracy propitiated an increase in redistribution demands. In &, however, these demands 
provoked an intense rejection, and eventually propitiated the outbreak of the civil war. In &,,, 
in contrast, increasing demands for redistribution resulted in growing social spending. Two 
factors must have been crucial in that sense. The first one has to do with the evolution of 
inequality. In &,,, overall inequality was significantly lower than in & (Prados de la 
Escosura 		
). Arguably, demands for redistribution must have also been lower and, therefore, 
more tolerable for higher income groups. 
In fact, when we look at the early stages of the development of the welfare state in a 
comparative perspective, social policy tended to develop first in more egalitarian countries, such 
as the Scandinavian ones, and not in more unequal countries, such as Spain (Espuelas 	7). 
Lindert (		2) calls this the Robin Hood paradox. In more egalitarian countries, social affinity 
between middle and lower-income groups tends to be greater, and the cost of redistribution 
smaller (for both higher and middle income groups), resulting in more political support for 
social policy expansion (Lindert 		2, Bénabou 		7). On the other hand, the nature of Spanish 
inequality in &,, and in & was also substantially different. Until the &7	s, inequality in 
Spain was mostly driven by between-group inequality, that is, by the gap between property 
incomes and labor incomes. Land was the main asset of the economy in that period, so that the 
concentration of land ownership was one of the main sources of inequality at the time.15 This 
helps explaining both the insistence in the agrarian eform on the part of the progressive 
governments of the second republic and the subsequent political instability. Since land is an 
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immobile asset (unable to leave the country), when t re are threats of expropriation landowners 
might be interested in supporting non-democratic governments to avoid redistribution (Boix 
		). 
In &,,, instead, wage dispersion had become the main component of inequality. As 
industrialization and structural change progressed lan rents lost relevance in the economy and 
within-group inequality, and particularly wage dispersion, became the main source of 
inequality. Wage dispersion, in fact, increased in the early stages of economic growth, but 
diminished again from circa &,	 onwards, following the logic of the Kuznets curve (Prados de 
la Escosura 		
). Inequality in &,, was, therefore, lower and much less dependent on land 
inequality than in &. As said before, this helps explaining why redistribution demands must 
have been more tolerable in &,, than in &, but also why tax-and-transfer redistribution 
replaced the former demands for expropriation. 
The international context may have also played a crucial role. In the second republic, 
redistributive struggles around land reform were mixed with the rise of fascism and left-wing 
revolutionary movements in &	s Europe. To some extent, the outbreak of the Spanish Civil 
War was an example of the political violence that hit t e continent during World War II. By 
contrast, in &,,, Spain had as a reference the social pacts that spread through Europe after 
World War II, which served as a basis for the growth of the welfare state and for preserving 
political stability. Someway, the Moncloa Pats were th  Spanish equivalent for the post-war 
European social pacts; and, as in Europe before, these favored the expansion of social spending. 
Both the center-right UCD (for Union de Centro Democrático in Spanish) and the socialist 
party stimulated social spending growth when they were in office in the late &,	s and the early 
&
	s. However, the so-called Keynesian consensus built after World War II, gradually 
disappeared throughout the &
	s and early &&	s leading to the stagnation in social spending in 
many European countries. In Spain, social spending sta nated in this time-period too, but at a 
lower level than in its European neighbors (see figure ). 
 
 
        Source: see table 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From &
7 onwards, and especially after the signing of the Maastricht treaty in &&, public 
deficit and inflation control became the main targets of economic policy. As a result, the 
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rule of the socialist and of the center-right Popular Party). The same way that in the &,, 
Moncloa Pacts both center-right and center-left politica  parties accepted the Keynesian 
consensus, in the &
	/&	s both the center-right and the center-left adopted what Offer and 
Söderberg (	 ) have labeled as the market turn.16 It is in this context that was signed the so-
called Toledo Pact in &&7 with the support of almost all political representatives at the time. Its 
purpose was to guarantee the financial stability of the pension system by establishing a clear 
distinction in the funding sources of contributory and non-contributory pensions. The growth of 
contributory pensions became linked to the availabil ty of funds coming from employers’ and 
employees’ contributions, which allowed for a reduction in government subsidies to social 
security funds. Non-contributory pensions, in turn, became to be financed by government 
subsidies exclusively.17 
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However, one of the main limitations of today’s social protection in Spain is that the generosity 
of non-contributory benefits is far behind that of c ntributory benefits. This has led to some sort 
of dualism, in the sense that social protection is significantly better for labor market insiders 
(who receive contributory benefits). This dualism, in turn, involves a gender bias. During 
Franco’s dictatorship, female activity rates were very low. Women were, in general, unable to 
contribute to public pensions funds (or at least to accumulate long contribution records). Today 
they are overrepresented among beneficiaries of (less generous) non-contributory pensions 
(León 		). On the other hand, public spending on family support in Spain remains below most 
European countries (see table ). Parental leave provisions are shorter, and family cash-benefits 
and social services for child-care smaller. This, in turn, has led to lower female labor market 
participation rates and a wider gender income gap (León and Salido 	 , Lindert 		2). To 
some extent, the precariousness of family policy in democratic Spain can be explained by the 
rejection of the antifeminist family policy of Franco’s dictatorship. As shown before, family 
policy played a crucial role in the propaganda of the dictatorship. Earlier democratic policy 
makers avoided any reference to family policy so as not to be identified with the authoritarian 
past (Valiente && ). Later, the restrictions to social spending growth of the mid-&
	s and early 
&&	s hampered the development of alternative (and more pro-feminist) family support policies. 
Actually, the current gap in aggregate social spending between Spain and Europe is to a large 
                                                   
16 Guillén and Álvarez (		2) qualify this and say that the socialist party accepted the European Union prescriptions 
for limiting the growth in public spending, while the center-right Popular Party, in fact, encouraged those policies. 
17 To qualify for contributory pensions in the Spanish system a previous contribution record is required, while for 
non-contributory pensions it is not. Before the Toled  Pact, social insurance funds (receiving compulsory 
contributions plus government subsidies) could be us d to finance either contributory or non-contributory benefits. 









2, after a number of popular uprisings, General Espartero said that, to avoid recurrent 
social revolts, Barcelona city had to be bombed at least once every 7	 years. Fortunately, by the 
late &th century, the Spanish government had changed its mind and social policy began to be 
seen as a more effective mechanism to reduce social conf ict. However, the path to social 
pacification and the creation of the welfare state was very slow. Before &,,, the Spanish 
government was unable (or unwilling) to increase taxation to finance new social programs. In 
this context, Spanish social reformers in the late &th century, early 	th century supported the 
creation of contributory social insurance programs (funded by employers’ and employees’ 
contributions) as an alternative to this lack of fiscal capacity. In the earlier stages of social 
reform, the government opted for voluntary, state-subsidized social insurance schemes. These 
programs, however, had a very modest growth (largely due to the lack of public funding). After 
World War I and the subsequent increase in social unrest, the Spanish government advocated 
for the creation of compulsory social insurance programs. Since a key objective of the 
government was to achieve social peace in the ruralareas, rural laborers were included in the 
new social plans (along with industrial workers). This, however, generated strong business 
opposition, especially from small-sized, labor intensive businesses (which were predominant in 
Spain) and from rural landowners. Increasing social unrest eventually ended up in the & 
military coup, which curb the previous reformist plans. 
With the advent of democracy in & new social insurance programs were introduced, but 
traditional obstacles persisted. The government passed a very timid tax reform, which turned 
insufficient to finance rising government expenditures. The Spanish government also tried to 
implement an ambitious agrarian reform. This, however, unleashed an unprecedented and fierce 
opposition from rural landowners that eventually contributed to the outbreak of the Spanish civil 
war. After the war, Franco’s dictatorship consolidated a conservative social insurance model, 
which relied almost exclusively on employers’ and employees’ compulsory contributions. 
Social benefits were kept very low; and employers showed little opposition to Franco’s social 
insurance model. The repression of the labor movement and trade protectionism allowed them 
to easily transfer the cost of social insurance to wages and consumer prices. This, however, 
gradually changed from the late & 	s, early &,	s onwards. Rapid economic growth, increasing 
political instability and decreasing political power of rural employers led to a rapid increase in 
social spending. Also, the Spanish economy became more open to international trade and a 
clandestine labor movement became increasingly powerful. As a result, Spanish employers were 
more and more unable to transfer the cost of social insurance to wages and consumer prices, 
eventually making the social insurance model of the dictatorship unsustainable. 
The restoration of democracy in &,, gave way to a new social insurance model. Public 
subsidies to social insurance programs increased aft r the introduction of income tax in &,,. 
Social spending was, thus, able to increase without putting so much pressure on employers’ and 
employees’ contributions. Unlike in &, political consensus to increase taxation and develop 
social policy emerged in &,,. In both cases the advent of democracy propitiated increasing 
redistribution demands. However, inequality in &,, was significantly lower and mostly driven 
by wage dispersion, whereas in & it was much higher and mostly driven by the concentration 
of property incomes (particularly land ownership). This would explain why redistribution 
demands were more tolerable politically in &,, than in &, and why demands for tax-and-
transfer redistribution replaced &	s expropriation demands. The international context was also 
& 
 
very different. In &,,, the Keynesian consensus and the social pacts that spread through Europe 
after World War II were a key reference for the Spanish government. The development of social 
policy was, in fact, crucial for the successful cons lidation of democracy in Spain. Throughout 
the &
	s Spanish social spending partly converged to the European levels. However, after the 
signing of the Maastricht treaty, in the early &&	s, the pace of social spending growth stagnated 
before Spain had reached the European levels. Today the main difference with Europe probably 
lies in public spending on family support, which is still far from the European standards. An 
additional shortcoming is that labor market outsiders receive less social protection than labor 
market insiders. The 		
 great recession, and the subsequent policies of public spending cuts, 
have imposed new limits to the expansion of the Spanish welfare state. Aggregate social 
spending levels have remained constant or have even increased slightly since the crisis started, 
but only because of the dramatic increase in unemployment spending. 
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